

Commonwealth/RBuder/WHB  
DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS  
MEMORANDUM

*Mr. Ruge* *12*  
*file*

TO: ..... Mr. Glazebrook

Security CONFIDENTIAL

Date December 21, 1961

FROM: ..... Commonwealth Division

File No.

50409-40"Y"

REFERENCE: .....

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SUBJECT: ..... INDONESIA.

cc 8250-E-40"K"

Mr. Bintara, Counsellor of the Indonesian Embassy, called on me yesterday primarily to discuss Goa. During our talk we also touched upon the subjects of West Irian and Greater Malaysia.

2. In speaking of Goa, I confined myself to the Prime Minister's statement on December 18, of which I gave Mr. Bintara a copy. I also recounted the discussions of the dispute in the Security Council. Mr. Bintara echoed the Indian case and praised their long patience with Portugal.

3. On the question of West Irian, Mr. Bintara said that since the Dutch had now agreed to talk with Indonesia about the future of West Irian, the Indonesian Government would wait to see what might come of these talks - but would not wait indefinitely. He attributed the fact that the Dutch were now willing to enter into discussions to the influence of President Kennedy. He expressed no great optimism about the outcome because, as he put it, the Indonesians had learnt through experience how stubborn the Dutch could be. He appeared to think that Dr. Luns was even more stubborn than his countrymen. The Indonesian case was that, having ejected the Dutch, they had the right to all the territory which the Dutch had held in the Dutch East Indies; West Irian should, therefore, come to Indonesia. The Dutch, he

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Mr. Robinson

added, were using West Irian as a hiding place for renegade Indonesians such as the former "so-called" President of the South Moluccas who had been there for some 10 years. He implied that some of the Indonesians who had rebelled against President Sukarno's government were also there and that there was some possibility of West Irian being used as a base for further action against the Republic of Indonesia. I gathered that President Sukarno already had shifted troops nearer to West Irian.

4. Mr. Bintara said more than once during our conversation that Indonesia had no designs on the island of Timor which had never been part of the Dutch East Indies. What the Indonesians wanted - and were entitled to - was everything that the Dutch had had. They had been patient for 12 years but if nothing came of the talks, they would probably be forced to consider "other means" of regaining West Irian. I suggested that since the Indians had waited 14 years, perhaps the Indonesians could be patient at least that much longer. Mr. Bintara was not enraptured by this counsel.

5. When I introduced the question of self-determination for the Papuans, Mr. Bintara said that they were so primitive that such a notion would mean nothing to them. He did not explain how they could be brought out of the Stone Age by the Indonesians more quickly than by the Dutch. There was obviously room for one more ethnic group in the variegated Indonesian pattern. It was nonsense, said Mr. Bintara, to claim, as the Dutch did, that President Sukarno was using the West Irian dispute as a means of distracting his peoples' attention from their dire economic plight. Before leaving the subject, I expressed my own hope that there would not be a resort to force.

6. We discussed at some length the projected Greater (Malaysia) and I gave Mr. Bintara some idea of the way things were being worked out between the Federation of Malaya, Singapore and the British Government acting for the Borneo Territories. Mr. Bintara asked whether

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the former provinces of Malaya which were now part of Southern Thailand might not some day want to become part of Greater Malaysia. As this was a subject of which I had no knowledge, I merely expressed interest, which, indeed, I felt. Mr. Bintara referred to the Thai oppression of the Muslim minorities in those parts of Thailand of which he had personal knowledge.

*R. Dudley.*

Commonwealth Division.